Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Lukes, Prodicus and B Hale / C Wright

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42 ideas

2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 1. Fallacy
It is a fallacy to explain the obscure with the even more obscure [Hale/Wright]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / d. Singular terms
Singular terms refer if they make certain atomic statements true [Hale/Wright]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / c. Grelling's paradox
If 'x is heterological' iff it does not apply to itself, then 'heterological' is heterological if it isn't heterological [Hale/Wright]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / g. Incompleteness of Arithmetic
The incompletability of formal arithmetic reveals that logic also cannot be completely characterized [Hale/Wright]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / d. Hume's Principle
Neo-logicism founds arithmetic on Hume's Principle along with second-order logic [Hale/Wright]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / e. Caesar problem
The Julius Caesar problem asks for a criterion for the concept of a 'number' [Hale/Wright]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / e. Structuralism critique
If structures are relative, this undermines truth-value and objectivity [Hale/Wright]
The structural view of numbers doesn't fit their usage outside arithmetical contexts [Hale/Wright]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism
Logicism is only noteworthy if logic has a privileged position in our ontology and epistemology [Hale/Wright]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / c. Neo-logicism
The neo-Fregean is more optimistic than Frege about contextual definitions of numbers [Hale/Wright]
Logicism might also be revived with a quantificational approach, or an abstraction-free approach [Hale/Wright]
Neo-Fregeanism might be better with truth-makers, rather than quantifier commitment [Hale/Wright]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
Are neo-Fregeans 'maximalists' - that everything which can exist does exist? [Hale/Wright]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
The identity of Pegasus with Pegasus may be true, despite the non-existence [Hale/Wright]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 3. Types of Properties
Maybe we have abundant properties for semantics, and sparse properties for ontology [Hale/Wright]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
A successful predicate guarantees the existence of a property - the way of being it expresses [Hale/Wright]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / c. Modern abstracta
Objects just are what singular terms refer to [Hale/Wright]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 7. Abstracta by Equivalence
Abstracted objects are not mental creations, but depend on equivalence between given entities [Hale/Wright]
One first-order abstraction principle is Frege's definition of 'direction' in terms of parallel lines [Hale/Wright]
Abstractionism needs existential commitment and uniform truth-conditions [Hale/Wright]
Equivalence abstraction refers to objects otherwise beyond our grasp [Hale/Wright]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / a. Sense and reference
Reference needs truth as well as sense [Hale/Wright]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 2. Analytic Truths
Many conceptual truths ('yellow is extended') are not analytic, as derived from logic and definitions [Hale/Wright]
19. Language / F. Communication / 3. Denial
Contradiction is impossible, since only one side of the argument refers to the true facts [Prodicus, by Didymus the Blind]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 1. Action Theory
There is collective action, where a trend is manifest, but is not attributable to individuals [Lukes]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 1. Social Power
Power is a capacity, which may never need to be exercised [Lukes]
Hidden powers are the most effective [Lukes]
The pluralist view says that power is restrained by group rivalry [Lukes]
One-dimensionsal power is behaviour in observable conflicts of interests [Lukes]
Political organisation brings some conflicts to the fore, and suppresses others [Lukes]
The two-dimensional view of power recognises the importance of controlling the agenda [Lukes]
Power can be exercised to determine a person's desires [Lukes]
Power is the capacity of a social class to realise its interests [Lukes]
The evidence for the exertion of power need not involve a grievance of the powerless [Lukes]
Power is affecting a person in a way contrary to their interests [Lukes]
Supreme power is getting people to have thoughts and desires chosen by you [Lukes]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 1. Ideology
In the 1950s they said ideology is finished, and expertise takes over [Lukes]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / a. Liberalism basics
Liberals take people as they are, and take their preferences to be their interests [Lukes]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 11. Capitalism
Anyone who thinks capitalism can improve their lives is endorsing capitalism [Lukes]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / c. Teleological Proof critique
People used to think anything helpful to life was a god, as the Egyptians think the Nile a god [Prodicus]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 5. Atheism
He denied the existence of the gods, saying they are just exaltations of things useful for life [Prodicus]
The gods are just personified human benefits [Prodicus]